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COMMON WORSHIP
Joshua Cockayne and David Efird
People of faith, particularly in the Judeo-Christian tradition, worship corpo-
rately at least as often, if not more so, than they do individually. Why do they 
do this? There are, of course, many reasons, some having to do with personal 
preference and others having to do with the theology of worship. But, in this 
paper, we explore one reason, a philosophical reason, which, despite recent 
work on the philosophy of liturgy, has gone underappreciated. In particu-
lar, we argue that corporate worship enables a person to come to know God 
better than they would otherwise know him in individual worship.
Introduction1
In the past fifty years, philosophers of religion have spent a great amount 
of time considering questions that relate to the epistemology of religious 
belief, in particular, to whether such belief is rational, justified, warranted, 
or, in some other way, epistemically permissible. These are just some of 
the questions that have generated thousands of pages of journal articles, 
books, and conference papers. However, if we look at the issues of reli-
gious belief “on the street” (to borrow a phrase from Mark Wynn),2 these 
are, perhaps, not the questions that occupy the minds of religious believers 
most of the time, for a commitment to religious belief, at least for many, is 
more than a commitment to believing certain doctrines or creeds; rather, 
it is a commitment to a way of life, a way of life typically characterized by 
attending corporate worship.
For many religious believers, they will spend thousands of hours in 
their lifetime singing hymns, listening to and saying prayers, and listening 
to sermons and homilies with other people. What is the point of spending 
all this time with all these people engaging in all this worship? We expect 
1We borrow the title from the name given to the series of services authorised for use in 
the Church of England, Common Worship, a liturgical alternative to the Book of Common Prayer. 
In this article, we attempt to give a broad account of liturgical worship, but, for the simple 
reason of familiarity, our discussion is primarily informed by the practice in the Church of 
England. 
2Wynn, Renewing the Senses, 12.
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we are not the first to ask this question, especially when we think of teen-
agers across the world being cajoled into going to church by their parents 
on Sunday mornings, or those who prefer worshipping on their own, by 
using some kind of liturgy, or by taking a walk on their own through a 
particularly beautiful part of nature and contemplating the goodness of 
God.
While there has been significant work recently on the philosophy of 
liturgical worship,3 this work does not adequately address the point, or 
the value, of corporate worship, as above, beyond, or just different from, 
individual worship.4 In this paper, we attempt to fill this lacuna. There 
are many answers that could be given which seek to explain the value 
of corporate worship. For instance, according to J. B. Torrance, corporate 
worship allows us to become “truly human” by expressing ourselves in 
relation God and to our fellow human,5 or, as Stanley Hauerwas contends, 
corporate worship provides a “foretaste of the unity of the communion 
of the saints.”6 Whilst it is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to give a 
definitive answer to this question, we suggest that one such value of cor-
porate worship is a kind of epistemic value. That is, we argue, one way in 
which corporate worship is better than individual worship is that it gives 
us the opportunity to know God better than we would otherwise know 
him in individual worship.7
To argue for this conclusion, we begin by reviewing Eleonore Stump’s 
account of what it is to come to know a person and Bonnie M. Talbert’s 
account of what it is to come to know a person well.8 After explaining 
Talbert’s criteria for what it is to come to know a person well, we aim to 
show that worshipping God is an opportunity to fulfil the first of Talbert’s 
3Nicholas Wolterstorff, The God We Worship; Terence Cuneo, Ritualized Faith. 
4Both Wolterstorff and Cuneo frame their discussions of liturgy in a corporate setting. For 
instance, Wolterstorff writes the following:
The church enacts the liturgy not to satisfy the needs and desires of individual 
congregants but to worship God. The church blesses God, praises God, thanks 
God, confesses her sins to God, petitions God, listens to God’s Word, celebrates the 
Eucharist. It is not the individual members who do these things simultaneously; it 
is the established body that does these things. (Wolterstorff, The God We Worship, 
11)
Additionally, Cuneo provides an account of collective singing in liturgy in which individ-
uals jointly-intend to sing the liturgical script (Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 135–140). Yet, what is 
lacking from this literature is a detailed account of why this setting makes any difference to 
the epistemology of liturgy.
5Torrance, Worship, 28. 
6Hauerwas, In Good Company, 157. 
7While this kind of corporate knowledge of God may be available through other corporate 
spiritual practices, such as group Bible study or group prayer meetings, we are concerned, 
in this paper, solely with the spiritual practice of worship and arguing that corporate wor-
ship has a particular epistemic value over individual worship that has not been sufficiently 
appreciated yet in the philosophical literature on liturgy. That is, we hold that knowing God 
through corporate worship is a species of the genus of knowing God corporately.
8Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 64–83; Talbert, “Knowing Other People.” 
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criteria for knowing a person well, and worshipping God corporately is an 
opportunity to fulfil, in part, Talbert’s other criteria for knowing a person 
well, though they cannot be completely fulfilled, as we note.
We argue that liturgical worship is a way to come to know God by 
adapting recent work on experiencing God second-personally in reading 
Scripture and celebrating the Eucharist.9 In this way, we argue, worship 
provides a believer with a mode of, and an occasion for, a second-per-
sonal experience of God, so that, in worship, the believer comes to know 
God second-personally. This is the first of Talbert’s criteria for knowing a 
person well. We then extend this epistemology of worship to account for 
the value of corporate worship, as a way of coming to know God better 
than we would otherwise know him in individual worship. Inspired by C. 
S. Lewis’s discussion of friendship in The Four Loves, according to which 
others bring out aspects of a friend that we could not bring out ourselves, 
we argue that, in taking part in corporate worship, a person can engage 
not only with God, as they experience him, but also with other members’ 
engagement with God, that is, how they experience him, thereby bringing 
out aspects of God that they would not be able to experience themselves. 
And we then conclude by applying the work of Axel Seemann and John 
Campbell on mutual perception to argue that corporate worship enables 
our worship to be shaped by others,10 thereby providing an opportunity 
to broaden our knowledge of God and remove any ingrained biases we 
may have.11
Knowing God and Knowing Him Better Than We Do Now
Just as, for the last fifty years, religious epistemology has been dominated 
by the problems of, and prospects for, the rationality, justification, war-
rantedness, and so on, of religious belief, for the last fifty years, analytic 
epistemology has been dominated by the problems of, and prospects 
for, propositional knowledge, that is, knowledge that, such as that Paula 
knows that Jerome is her friend. Our project concerns something dif-
ferent. It is not concerned with knowing that God exists, but, rather, with 
knowing God, and more, how we might come to know him better than 
we do now. We begin our account of what it is to know God well with 
Eleonore Stump’s account of what is required to know a person.
In her magisterial Wandering in Darkness, Stump gives an account of a 
certain kind of knowledge which is irreducible to propositional knowl-
edge. This kind of knowledge she calls “Franciscan knowledge” in contrast 
to “Dominican knowledge,” which is either propositional knowledge or 
reducible to propositional knowledge. Examples of Franciscan knowledge 
9Green and Quan, “More than Inspired Propositions”; Cockayne et al., “Experiencing the 
Real Presence of Christ.” Here we adopt the view that all who participate in the Eucharist, 
both the congregation and the president, are celebrants of the Eucharist: “Holy Communion 
is celebrated by the whole people of God gathered for worship” (Common Worship, 158).
10Seemann, “Joint Attention”; Campbell, “Joint Attention.” 
11These conditions concern Talbert’s remaining criteria for knowing a person well.
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include what we might call “narrative knowledge,” that is, the knowledge 
you gain from reading a work of great literature. Part of what makes the 
work a great work of literature is that you learn something, something 
about yourself or the world, and this “something” you just cannot put into 
words. In a slogan—you have learned something that goes beyond what 
you can say.
Another example of Franciscan knowledge, according to Stump, is phe-
nomenal knowledge, that is, the knowledge of what-it-is-like-ness, such 
as what it is like to see a red tomato, to feel the pang of jealousy, to taste 
the bitterness of a lemon, and so forth. She thinks this phenomenal knowl-
edge is irreducible to propositional knowledge because of Frank Jackson’s 
thought experiment about Mary,12 the super-smart colour scientist, who 
knows all the propositional information there is to know about red but 
has never seen the colour, having lived all her days in a black and white 
room; one day, she is released from her room and sees, say, a red tomato, 
and Stump takes it that she has learned something new upon seeing the 
red tomato. This new piece of knowledge can be neither propositional 
knowledge nor reducible to propositional knowledge, since she had all 
that knowledge prior to her release. It must, rather, be Franciscan knowl-
edge, or so Stump maintains.
Innovatively extending Jackson’s thought experiment, Stump gives a 
third example of Franciscan knowledge, namely, personal knowledge, a 
kind of knowledge that begins with a second-personal experience. On her 
version of the thought experiment, Mary is brought up in a room in which 
she has access to only third-personal propositional information about the 
world. What would Mary learn, Stump asks, when she encounters her 
mother for the first time, for example? And what does this tell us about 
what she lacks from her third-person perspective? According to Stump,
When Mary is first united with her mother, it seems indisputable that Mary 
will know things she did not know before, even if she knew everything 
about her mother that could be made available to her in non-narrative prop-
ositional form, including her mother’s psychological states. Although Mary 
knew that her mother loved her before she met her, when she is united with 
her mother, Mary will learn what it is like to be loved. . . . [W]hat will come 
as the major revelation to Mary is her mother. . . . What is new for Mary is a 
second-person experience.13
Just as Mary gained phenomenal knowledge in seeing a red tomato, so 
Mary gains personal knowledge on meeting her mother, both being Fran-
ciscan knowledge. What occasions this personal knowledge for Mary is 
her second-personal experience with her mother.
Generalizing from this thought experiment, Stump claims that Paula 
has a second-person experience of Jerome only if
12Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia.”
13Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 52–53.
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(1) Paula is aware of Jerome as a person (call the relation Paula has to Je-
rome in this condition “personal interaction”),
(2) Paula’s personal interaction with Jerome is of a direct and immediate 
sort, and
(3) Jerome is conscious,14
and it is this kind of experience that is required for Paula to come to know 
Jerome, that is, for Paula to come to have personal knowledge of Jerome.
Now, it should be noted, at this point, that Paula’s having a sec-
ond-personal experience of Jerome is necessary, but not sufficient for, 
knowing Jerome. For all that is required for a second-personal experience 
is a kind of awareness, and awareness is insufficient for personal knowl-
edge because awareness need not involve what Stump calls “significant 
personal presence,” which, Stump takes it, personal knowledge requires.15 
Say that you sit next to someone on the bus. You are aware of them, and 
you interact with them directly and immediately, and the person is con-
scious (it is not a late-night bus), and so you are having a second-person 
experience of them, but you do not know them because, even though you 
are both present, you are not present to one another (as in, “We had dinner 
together, but she was not present to me, as she was on her phone all eve-
ning.”) To be present to another person, you have to attend to them, and 
this is what needs to be added to second-personal experience to produce 
personal knowledge. In other words, for Paula to come to know Jerome, 
not only must she be aware of Jerome, but also, she must attend to him, 
and him to her. This kind of mutual attending psychologists call “joint 
attention.” More specifically, for Paula to come to know Jerome she must 
engage in dyadic joint attention with him, where dyadic joint attention 
consists in Paula and Jerome attending to one another. (Triadic joint atten-
tion, which we will discuss later, consists in Paula and Jerome attending 
to a third object while they attend to one another.) The reason dyadic joint 
attention is required for personal knowledge is that it is only in the context 
of joint attention that Paula can reveal herself to Jerome and Jerome can 
accurately perceive what Paula has revealed to him. So, personal knowl-
edge not only requires second-personal experience but also dyadic joint 
attention.
Now, it is important to note that personal knowledge comes in de-
grees. You can know one person better than you know another, and you 
can come to know a person better as you experience more of them in 
more contexts and environments. This is something Bonnie M. Talbert’s 
analysis of personal knowledge emphasizes.16 One way to examine this 
phenomenon, of knowing someone better, is by considering the end-point 
of coming to know them better, that is, of what it is to know them well. 
14Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 75–76.
15Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 110.
16Talbert, “Knowing Other People.”
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Knowing someone well, as Talbert describes it, “is normally the product 
of a sequence of interactions” that have, minimally, the following features:
(1) We have had a significant number of second-person face-to-face interac-
tions with A, at least some of which have been relatively recent.
(2) The contexts of those interactions were such as to permit A to reveal 
important aspects of her/himself, and A has done so.
(3) A has not deceived us about him/herself in important respects.
(4) We have succeeded in accurately perceiving what A has revealed—i.e. 
[our judgement is not impaired] by [our] own biases.17
These conditions, as Talbert describes them, help us to “map out features 
of interactions ordinarily necessary to ground claims to know someone 
well.”18
Do Talbert’s conditions apply to the context of knowing God well? If 
God is a person, and Talbert has correctly identified the conditions for 
knowing a person, then we might assume so. But God is a special person. 
And part of what makes him special seems to make it hard for us to know 
him, let alone know him well, in this life.19 To begin, we cannot see God 
face-to-face, not only because he is incorporeal, but also because, as God 
said to Moses, “you cannot see my face; for no one shall see me and live” 
(Exodus 33:20). Yet, Talbert stresses that face-to-face interaction plays an 
important role in second-personal knowledge. She writes,
In face-to-face interaction, we can see, hear, and smell the same things at the 
same time. The possibilities for joint attention (where two people are paying 
attention to the same thing, and each is aware of the other’s attention) make 
it possible that not only are we both looking at the same tree, I know you see 
the tree and you know that I see it, and we both know that we both see the 
tree. In short, we can jointly attend to objects in our shared environment.20
Now, Talbert is undoubtedly correct in stating that face-to-face inter-
action makes it easier to engage with a person second-personally, but, as 
we will see in the next section, by considering recent work on sharing 
attention with God, it is at least possible to engage in joint attention with a 
person without seeing them face-to-face.21 Thus, we might think, the con-
dition might be weakened in the following way:
17Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 194. 
18Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 196.
19Perhaps we can know God well in the life to come (cf. 1 Corinthians 13.12).
20Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 193. 
21The best way of defending this condition, we think, assumes that God is omnipresent 
in the way defined by Stump (Wandering in Darkness, 117). For Stump, God’s omnipresence 
consists, in part, in his being available for significant personal presence, which includes 
second-personal experience and dyadic joint attention, always and everywhere, and so in 
(places of) worship. Thus, rather than thinking of God as fundamentally located at all places, 
Stump thinks God’s omnipresence requires that he be derivatively located at all places by 
means of his always willing to share attention with us. It might be objected, as an anonymous 
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(1*) We have had had a significant number of second-person interac-
tions with A, at least some of which have been relatively recent.
However, this revised condition is still problematic in the context of 
knowing God since there appear to be obvious counter-examples: first, 
someone who knows God well on the first meeting, and secondly, someone 
who knows God well despite not interacting with him second-personally 
for a long time.
To begin, it might be thought that someone could experience God for 
the first time in a significant self-revelation of God, and in that one expe-
rience know him well. But this is not possible, at least in this life.22 For we 
could come to know God well in one significant self-revelation in this life 
only if we would know how to understand such a self-revelation. And 
we would know how to understand such a self-revelation only if we had 
experienced similar self-revelations of other people very much like God 
previously, perhaps in increasingly more significant self-revelations. But 
God is very much unlike people we have come to know, even come to 
know well. And so, such a self-revelation of God would be discontinuous 
reviewer has, that this assumption (that God is available for significant present to us always 
and everywhere) simply denies the phenomenon of divine hiddenness. As a divine phenom-
enon, that is, of God hiding himself from us, yes, we do deny that God does that, but, as a 
human phenomenon, of us, most of the time and in most places, being unable, because we 
are distracted, and unwilling, because we are disinterested, to be significantly present to God 
ourselves, we affirm it. As Stump writes,
Given divine omnipresence, the only thing that makes a difference to the kind of 
personal presence, significant or minimal, that God has to a human person is the 
condition of the human person herself. If Paula wants Jerome to be significantly 
present to her, she alone will not be able to bring about what she wants, because 
the relationship she wants is up to Jerome as much as it is up to her, and, for one 
reason or another, Jerome may fail to meet the conditions requisite for signifi-
cant personal presence. But, on the doctrine of omnipresence, things are different 
when it comes to God’s being significantly present to a human person. If Paula 
wants God to be significantly present to her, what is needed to bring about what 
she wants depends only on her, on her being able and willing to share attention 
with God. Because God is omnipresent, then, if Paula is able and willing to share 
attention with God, the presence omnipresent God has to her will be significant 
personal presence. If she is not able and willing, then God will have only minimal 
personal presence with respect to her. (Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 117)
This approach to the problem of “divine hiddenness,” as it is known, is broadly in the 
tradition of St John of the Cross. As Sarah Coakley explains John’s perspective on this phe-
nomenon,
The appearance of divine “hiddenness” is the effect of a human epistemological and 
moral condition, not an ontological state of affairs that bespeaks any divine failure 
to communicate or self-disclose, let alone to effect an intentional withdrawal or 
abandonment. (Coakley, “Divine Hiddenness,” 231)
We return to this theme of “divine hiddenness,” or, on our account, “human distractedness 
and disinterestedness,” toward the end of the paper, when we discuss the importance of 
co-perceivers for better perception of what God has revealed of himself to us.
22It may be that a person could know God well in one significant self-revelation of God in 
the life to come, particularly in the beatific vision. We leave for another occasion the explora-
tion of this possibility, as we are concerned in this paper with the value of corporate worship 
in this life and not in the life to come. 
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with our previous experiences of self-revelations of other people. Thus, it 
would not be possible for us to understand a significant self-revelation of 
God sufficient to come to know him well. Indeed, such a self-revelation 
might be painful for us, as it was to St John of the Cross.23 Consequently, 
we cannot, at least in this life, come to know God well in one significant 
self-revelation, and so we cannot remove the requirement that we have 
had a significant number of second-person interactions with God in order 
to know him well.
But what about the “recency” element? Must some of those sec-
ond-person interactions with God be recent if we are to know him well? 
Consider the case of Mother Teresa, who, for the last forty years of her 
life reported experiencing a dark night of the soul in which God felt dis-
tant or even absent from her. Could such a person know God or know 
God well?24 Surely, if anybody is a candidate for knowing God well, or 
relatively well, in this life, then someone like Mother Teresa would be a 
suitable candidate. So how do we deal with cases such as hers?
There seems to be two motivations behind the recency condition. The 
first has to do with people changing over time. If we have not seen a person 
over a number of years, it is plausible that we do not know them as well as 
we used to, or even at all, because what made them the person we knew 
has changed so much: Their beliefs, their desires, their values, their goals, 
and all the rest may be quite different from what they were when we spent 
time with them. In such a case, we might say that we used to know them, 
but we do not anymore. The second motivation has to do with our mem-
ories, that memories of experiences of other people can become forgotten 
or distorted over the passage of time. If we knew a person a number of 
years ago, even if they have not changed much at all, we might no longer 
know them as well, or even at all, if we have forgotten our experiences 
with them or our memories of them are wildly inaccurate.
With these two motivations in mind, let us think about Mother Teresa 
and God. For many years, she had not had a second-personal experience 
of God. Yet, even after this time, she still knew him as well as anyone ever 
did in this life, or so it seems to us. The first motivation for the recency 
condition, that people change, does not seem to apply to God, or at least 
not as much as it does to human beings. While it is contentious whether 
God changes at all, it is relatively uncontroversial that he does not change 
fundamentally. That is, the beliefs, desires, values, and goals God has 
do not change, or do not change much. So, the first motivation does not 
seem to apply to this case. But what about the second? Mother Teresa is a 
human being subject to the cognitive limitations we all have to deal with. 
In particular, her memory, no doubt, was imperfect. But her memories 
of her experiences of God had to be present and true, for how else could 
she have done the work she did with the poor of Calcutta? We find it 
23Cf. Coakley, “Divine Hiddenness.” 
24With thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
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unlikely that she had forgotten her experiences of God or her memories 
of these experiences were distorted by time. So, while there is still reason, 
deriving from the second motivation, to include the “recency” condition 
in the analysis, we can add a caveat which will allow Mother Teresa to still 
know God well despite the many years in which she did not experience 
him second-personally:
(1**) We have had had a significant number of second-person interac-
tions with A, at least some of which have been relatively recent, 
unless we have a significant body of memories of second-person 
interactions with A which have not been distorted.
A further problem when applying Talbert’s conditions to the case of 
knowing God is that we cannot perceive God accurately in this life; God 
is too great, and our intellects are too weak.25 This appears to put pres-
sure on the application of conditions (2)–(4) in knowing God. But, just as 
knowledge of a person comes in degrees, so does accuracy of perception 
of a person. That is, just as we can know a person better, so we can per-
ceive what they reveal to us of themselves better. And the latter leads to 
the former. Even though, in this life, we cannot see God face-to-face, and 
we cannot perceive what he reveals to us of himself entirely accurately, we 
can nevertheless come to know him, specifically in worship. Furthermore, 
we argue, corporate worship provides us with an opportunity to come to 
know God better (than we would otherwise know him in individual wor-
ship) because (i) corporate worship gives God an opportunity to reveal 
aspects of himself he could not as easily reveal in individual worship, and 
(ii) corporate worship helps us to perceive what God has revealed to us of 
himself better (than we would otherwise perceive in individual worship) 
by removing biases and other impairments that alter our judgment or per-
ception. Thus, even if we cannot know God well, since we can know God 
better, we see no need to amend conditions (2)–(4).
We propose, then, the following adapted version of Talbert’s analysis. 
Paula knows God well when
(1) Paula has had a significant number of second-person interactions 
with God, at least some of which have been relatively recent, unless 
she has a significant body of memories of second-person interac-
tions with God which have not been distorted.
(2) The contexts of those interactions were such as to permit God to 
reveal important aspects of himself, and God has done so.
(3) God has not deceived Paula about himself in important respects.
(4) Paula has succeeded in accurately perceiving what God has re-
vealed—i.e., Paula’s judgement is not impaired by her own biases.
25Following Aquinas, we take it that we will be able to perceive God accurately in the life 
to come when God grants us this knowledge by joining our intellects (Summa Theologica, 1a 
12.4.co). 
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To consider what epistemic value corporate worship might provide, 
let us now consider the application of these conditions in the context of 
corporate worship.
Liturgical Worship as an Opportunity to Have  
Second-personal Interactions with God
To begin, liturgical worship helps us to come to know God better by 
providing us with opportunities to have a significant number of sec-
ond-personal experiences of God, thereby fulfilling Talbert’s first condition 
of knowing a person well, as applied to our knowing God. To explain 
how corporate worship is able to do this, we first outline Adam Green 
and Keith A. Quan’s discussion of experiencing God through Scripture,26 
before considering its application to the case of corporate worship.
Building on Stump’s work on experiencing God second-personally, 
Green and Quan argue that reading Scripture can give us a kind of inter-
personal knowledge of God by allowing us to share attention with God. In 
giving an account of sharing attention with God through Scripture, Green 
and Quan attempt to explain the theological claim that God is present in, 
and speaks through, the pages of Scripture. They argue that, in reading 
Scripture, a person can engage in “cooperative activity with the divine 
in which God uses the text of the Scriptures to reveal Himself dyadically 
or triadically.”27 That is, the text not only prompts the individual to the 
possibility of God’s presence, but also, it provides the means of experi-
encing God’s presence. They use the following example to highlight the 
possibility of sharing attention through text:
Alex wins a private cooking lesson with Rachael Ray. He is deaf, so Rachael 
communicates with him using written notes. At a certain point in the lesson, 
she hands him a note that reads, “Consider the golden-brown crust of this 
zucchini bake,” at which point he attends with Rachael to the crust. He looks 
back at Rachael who smiles and holds out a note between them that reads, 
“You done good.”28
They claim that, “just as Ray hands Alex a note saying he ‘done good’ 
[which] shapes how Alex experiences Ray’s kindly smile, so God might 
elect for the contents of Scripture to shape a dyadic experience of the 
divine.”29 What we come to know from reading Scripture, if Green and 
Quan are right, is not some claim about God, but, rather, we come to know 
God, that is, we come to know him personally.
There is no reason why this account cannot be extended beyond the dis-
cussion of Scripture. Straightforwardly, any spiritual practice which uses 
text would allow for attention sharing in the way that Green and Quan 
26Green and Quan, “More than Inspired Propositions.” 
27Green and Quan, “More than Inspired Propositions,” 427.
28Green and Quan, “More than Inspired Propositions,” 422.
29Green and Quan, “More than Inspired Propositions,” 426. 
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describe. Thus, the use of a liturgical script could allow a person to share 
attention with God in the way described by Green and Quan. However, 
we know that liturgy involves not only the reciting of certain words, but 
also the performing of certain actions. As Cuneo notes, liturgical practice 
involves certain act-types such as “entering a space of worship, singing, 
bowing, listening, eating, and the like”30 as well as the reciting of a script. 
Consequently, the performance of certain actions can also provide the kind 
of attention sharing Green and Quan claim is possible with texts. As we 
have argued elsewhere, in our discussion of experiencing the real presence 
of Christ in the Eucharist,31 Green and Quan’s analysis can also be extended 
to the use of certain ritual actions. We provide the following application of 
Green and Quan’s thought experiment to illustrate this possibility:
Alex and Rachael have been married for fifty years. On their first date, Alex 
cooked Rachael a steak with peppercorn sauce and green beans. Recently, 
they have been having difficulties in their marriage, but decide to devote 
the evening to spend together. Alex comes in the room, looks at Rachael, 
and presents her with a plate of steak with peppercorn sauce and green 
beans. Rachael looks back at Alex, without saying anything and smiles at 
him, whilst placing her hand over her ring finger.32
In such a case, objects, events, and rituals can play an important role in 
attention sharing experiences.33 If this is so, there is an obvious extension 
to be made to the experience of taking part in the Eucharist. The Eucha-
rist, thought of as a kind of reconciliation meal, can play a similar role in 
the reconciliation between Christ and a person as it can between Rachael 
and Alex. The elements provide an object for mutual attention sharing 
between Christ and the person and, consequently, for shared attention.34 
Thus, in experiencing God second-personally by reading Scripture, or 
by sharing attention with God by engaging with liturgical worship, it is 
possible for a person to meet the minimal requirements for knowing God 
personally, namely, experiencing him second-personally and dyadically 
sharing attention with him, as discussed in Stump’s account of knowing 
a person.
Moreover, we think, not only can such experiences of shared attention 
meet the minimal conditions for knowing God, but also, they can improve 
a person’s knowledge of God. Recall that our modification of Talbert’s first 
condition required that to know God, a person must have a significant 
number of second-personal interactions with God. By focusing only on 
30Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 10.
31Cockayne et al., “Experiencing the Real Presence of Christ.” 
32Cockayne et al., “Experiencing the Real Presence of Christ,” 17.
33Cockayne et al., “Experiencing the Real Presence of Christ,” 17.
34This account of coming to know God second-personally has also been extended to non-
verbal- or non-text-based practices too. David Efird and Daniel Gustafson (“Experiencing 
Christian Art”), for instance, have argued that Christian art can allow for second-personal 
experience of God. 
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this first condition, we can see that the number of second-personal inter-
actions, more often than not, brings about an improvement in personal 
knowledge (though we will see in the proceeding sections that the content 
and breadth of these experiences is also important for an improvement in 
personal knowledge). In general, the more times we engage with a person 
second-personally, the more chances we have to get to know them better. 
The same is also true of God, we think. Indeed, this might go some way 
to explaining the importance of repetition in the use of spiritual practices.
One of the reasons that the frequency of experiences of shared attention 
improves our knowledge of another person, as Talbert explains it, is that 
these experiences can allow us to gain a certain kind of practical knowl-
edge, that is, a knowledge of how to interact with them. She writes the 
following:
To know another is to know how to successfully interact with him/her over 
time. Knowing how to interact with a particular person starts with the large-
ly ineffable ability to recognize him/her, which recognition comes to be as-
sociated with a more complex mental representation of that individual. . . . 
Our interactive skills are largely intuitive and difficult to express in propo-
sitional terms. For example, when I am talking to Shannon, I find that I pace 
my remarks differently than I do when I am talking to Deme. Without think-
ing about it I seem to adjust the pace of my conversation to what I somehow 
perceive is most suitable to the interaction.35
Now, Talbert’s analysis of practical knowledge and personal knowledge 
has an important application to the use of corporate liturgical worship. As 
Cuneo has argued, “Knowing God consists in (although is not exhausted 
by) knowing how to engage God,”36 where knowing how to engage God 
consists in knowing a way of acting. A way of acting is “a sequence of 
act-types that an agent can perform.”37 The actions of singing, chanting, 
prostrating, and eating, for instance, can “count in the context of a litur-
gical performance as cases of blessing, petitioning, and thanking God.”38 
Thus, he argues, “If this is correct, the liturgy provides the materials for 
not only engaging but also knowing how to engage God.”39
35Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 196–197. 
36Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 149.
37Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 151.
38Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 163.
39Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 163. Nicholas Wolterstorff, in “Knowing God Liturgically,” 
agrees with him that the knowledge gained in liturgy is objectual knowledge, and the object 
is not a proposition, but whereas on Cuneo’s account, the object is a way of acting, on Wolt-
erstorff’s account, the object is a person, namely, God, and the knowledge gained in liturgy 
is knowledge of what God is like. According to Wolterstorff, in the use of liturgy, we address 
God as being a certain way, for instance, that is he is worthy of praise and adoration. The 
repetition of our addressing God in this way, allows us to gain a knowledge of what God is 
like. Wolterstorff writes the following:
To participate in engaging God liturgically in the form of addressing God is to take 
God to be a “thou” whom it is appropriate to address, to take God to be capable of 
listening, to take God to be worthy of praise and adoration, to take God to be ca-
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Following the work of Green and Quan, Cuneo, as well as our earlier 
work on the Eucharist, we can see that sharing attention with God by 
singing hymns, saying prayers, or participating in the Eucharist can con-
tribute to a person’s second-personal knowledge of God.40 Now, for most 
worshippers, these activities take place corporately, in gathered services 
involving some sort of leader and one or more congregants. However, 
much of what we have argued so far could be applied equally to indi-
vidual and corporate worship, for many cases of reading Scripture alone 
or saying the daily office could allow a person to experience God sec-
ond-personally. The ways in which corporate worship provides improves 
upon a person’s knowledge of God in ways that an individual cannot are 
yet to be specified. And that is what we turn to now.
Corporate Worship as an Opportunity for God to Reveal Aspects of Himself
Let us consider our second condition in the context of corporate worship. 
Our claim is that corporate worship provides a context for interactions with 
God which permit him to reveal more aspects of himself than he would 
otherwise have an opportunity to do in individual worship. To argue for 
this, we begin by considering a point made by C. S. Lewis, namely, that 
different friends bring out different aspects of a mutual friend, to argue 
that different worshippers, that is, different friends of God, bring out dif-
ferent aspects of God in the shared world of corporate worship, so that 
each worshipper gets to experience more aspects of God than they would 
otherwise experience if they were worshipping alone.
For Lewis, an important part of a person’s friendship with other people 
is their experience of them communally. He imagines the following sce-
nario:
If, of three friends (A, B, and C), A should die, then B loses not only A but 
“A’s part in C,” while C loses not only A but “A’s part in B.” In each of my 
friends there is something that only some other friend can fully bring out. By 
myself I am not large enough to call the whole man into activity; I want oth-
er lights than my own to show all his facets. Now that Charles is dead, I shall 
never again see Ronald’s reaction to a specifically Charles joke. Far from 
having more of Ronald, having him “to myself” now that Charles is away, I 
have less of Ronald. Hence true Friendship is the least jealous of loves. Two 
friends delight to be joined by a third, and three by a fourth, if only the new-
comer is qualified to become a real friend. They can say, as the blessed souls 
say in Dante, “Here comes one who will augment our loves.” For in this love 
“to divide is not to take away.” Of course, the scarcity of kindred souls—not 
pable of listening, to take God to be worthy of praise and adoration. (Wolterstorff, 
“Knowing God Liturgically,” 13)
Wolterstorff sees his position as complementing the insights of both Stump and Cuneo in 
explaining how person knowledge can be involved in liturgical practice. 
40Of course, there may other benefits of shared attention experiences other than personal 
knowledge. As we state in the opening section, our focus here is on the epistemic value of 
corporate worship in allowing us to know God better. For this reason, we only consider the 
role of shared attention in allowing us to know God personally. 
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to mention practical considerations about the size of rooms and the audi-
bility of voices—set limits to the enlargement of the circle, but within those 
limits we possess each friend not less but more as the number of those with 
whom we share him increases.41
Lewis’s point seems to be right. We know from experience that most of our 
friendships are interdependent on other friendships and relationships. As 
social creatures, our experience, and subsequent knowledge of persons, is 
interwoven into specific contexts and environments, as well as into wider 
relationships. We know that different of our friends bring out different 
aspects of our personality, including some aspects we thought we had 
long ago left behind, such as when old school friends make us regress 
into acting like immature teenagers. So, when you are with a friend, and 
you meet other of their friends you have not met before, you can come 
to see a different side to them you have not seen before; imagine tagging 
along with them as they met their old school friends. One of the values of 
having such an experience of your friend is that in seeing them act like an 
immature teenager, you come to know them better, namely, by revealing 
more of that person to you and so being able to share more of their world 
with them. Consequently, following Talbert’s account of what it is to know 
a person well, it seems reasonable to think that the more we encounter a 
person with other of their friends the more opportunities we have to come 
to know them better.
By drawing on Talbert’s work, as well as literature on the shared atten-
tion, we think that there are at least two ways of construing Lewis’s point 
in more specific terms. The most natural reading of Lewis’s point concerns 
the objects of our experience—by sharing attention with a person in a 
broader social sphere, we are able to experience more of that person as the 
object of our attention. We consider this interpretation of Lewis’s thought 
first, in this section. After this, in the next section, we consider another 
aspect of Lewis’s thought, although, admittedly this second reading is less 
obviously Lewis’s concern. As we will show, one way of understanding 
the effects of experiencing a friend in broader social spheres is that we 
are able to allow others to shape our attention in ways which allow us to 
perceive other aspects of our friend, previously unavailable to us.
Let us first consider how social experiences can broaden and deepen 
our perception of the object of our experience. As we have seen, amongst 
Talbert’s concerns for knowing a person well is something similar to this 
first reading of Lewis’s thought—that to know a person well, we must 
have a deep and broad experience of that person in different contexts and 
environments. Talbert argues that to ground our personal knowledge of 
another person and, thereby, allow them to reveal important aspects of 
themselves, we must have a certain shared experience, or shared world, 
with that person. She writes,
41Lewis, The Four Loves, 73–74.
313COMMON WORSHIP
Many of the factors determining the reliability of our knowledge of other 
people have to do with the extent of our shared worlds. We can talk about 
shared worlds in two senses: the wide and the narrow. In the wide sense, typ-
ical humans share a tremendous amount of background information about 
their worlds that arises out of their shared physiologies, cultural member-
ship, and other sources. . . . In the narrow sense, two or more individuals can 
be said to have shared worlds to the extent of their shared experiences—e.g. 
similar memories of past episodes of joint attention.42
As Talbert goes on to note, the extent of our shared worlds and shared ex-
periences with another person can make a difference to how well we know 
that person.43 These depth and breadth requirements are met when people 
come to share a world, that is, share a world not only in a “wide sense,” 
where a person shares a world with many other people based on widely 
shared characteristics, but also in a “narrow sense,” where a person shares 
a world with another based on interactive, shared experiences. These in-
teractive, shared experiences help generate a shared history and a body 
of common knowledge, which enable each person to interpret the mental 
states of the other person reliably. She cites the example of a couple who 
share in an intense six-day romance; although such couples “often believe 
that they know each other well,” she notes that they “are almost entirely 
wrong.”44 A part of what is lacking from such a romance, Talbert argues, 
is the lack of a shared world.
One way of construing Talbert’s depth and breadth requirements in 
Lewis’s terms, then, is to focus on the shared world of the two people 
who know each other. Whilst there is surely more to a shared world than 
shared relationships, this seems to be a vital part of sharing worlds with 
another person. When a couple meet each other’s families, for instance, 
the depth and breadth of their second-personal knowledge of each other 
will increase because they will see aspects of the other person brought 
out by their family that they had not seen before. Not only will they learn 
new things about each other, and new ways of engaging with each other, 
but also, they will share more of their world with each other because they 
will come to see aspects of their characters that were hidden before, or 
dispositions that were dormant. This will no doubt make a difference to 
the character of their attention sharing with each other, and subsequently, 
increase the depth and breadth of their personal knowledge of one an-
other. They will, in short, know each other better now that they have met 
each other’s families.
Assuming this application of Lewis’s observation is correct, let us now 
consider the implications for corporate worship. If a good way of knowing 
another person well is to engage with them in a variety of contexts and 
environments, so that we see more of them and build up a shared world 
42Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 199.
43Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 199–200.
44Talbert, “Knowing Other People,” 200.
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together, and, if engaging with them with other people helps to do this, 
then the same might be said of our coming to know God better: by en-
gaging with God with other people, we have an opportunity to come to 
know more of God and come to share more of his world, and so come 
to know him better. Lewis makes this point himself, continuing from the 
passage quoted above:
In this [possessing each friend not less but more as the number of those with 
whom we share him increases], Friendship exhibits a glorious “nearness 
by resemblance” to Heaven itself where the very multitude of the blessed 
(which no [human] can number) increases the fruition which each has of 
God. For every soul, seeing Him in her own way, doubtless communicates 
that unique vision to all the rest. That, says an old author, is why the Sera-
phim in Isaiah’s vision are crying “Holy, Holy, Holy” to one another (Isaiah 
6:3). The more we thus share the Heavenly Bread between us, the more we 
shall have.45
If it is true that different people bring out different characteristics and as-
pects of a person, then we might think that by engaging in a community 
of believers who are also engaging with God, we are able to see different 
aspects of God than were available alone. Unless we are fundamentalists 
about our own tradition or spirituality, most of us would admit that we 
benefit from partaking in different kinds of worship. More formal, con-
templative worship allows us to engage with God’s holiness and approach 
God with awe, for instance. And more informal worship might allow us 
to appreciate God’s closeness and the normality of God’s presence in the 
everyday, for example. If this is the case for traditions, then surely it is the 
case for individuals. If Lewis is right in thinking that only Ronald can bring 
out a certain aspect of Charles, then we should think of corporate worship 
as playing a similar role in the spiritual life. The same might be the case 
on a smaller scale. Worshipping God alongside someone whom we know 
to be overcome with guilt, for instance, will bring home aspects of God’s 
grace and mercy. It is possible in such an experience that, in engaging with 
someone who is engaging with God in a way radically different from our 
own, we see aspects of God which were not available to us alone.46
45Lewis, The Four Loves, 74.
46However, whilst Lewis’s example is helpful, it might be objected that there are some 
disanalogies between Lewis’s case and the case of corporate worship. In Lewis’s example, 
the object of our experience (our friend) might be altered in a variety of different ways. For 
instance, in experiencing a friend, Ronald, laugh at a particularly Caroline joke, that is, a 
joke that Charles, also a friend, would have told or appreciated, we see a different aspect of 
his character, thereby shaping our experience of him. However, we might also think that, 
in seeing Charles react to Ronald’s laughing, we come to see something of our friend which 
we had previously disregarded. In terms of corporate worship, the first possibility corre-
sponds with a person experiencing God differently by engaging with others’ engagement 
with God, and the second possibility corresponds with a person seeing a member of the 
church respond to God and so bringing them to see something new about God. Now, while 
the second possibility looks like it will occur more frequently in corporate worship, the first 
could happen, too.
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Corporate Worship as Enabling Us to Perceive God Better
Assuming that God cannot deceive us, and, therefore, that condition (3) of 
Talbert’s analysis (God has not deceived Paula about himself in important 
respects) is fulfilled,47 let us turn to condition (4):
(4) Paula has succeeded in accurately perceiving what God has re-
vealed—i.e., Paula’s judgement is not impaired by her own biases.
As we suggested, there are (at least) two ways of specifying the point of 
Lewis’s example. The first, which we explored in the previous section fo-
cused on the fact that that the presence of others can have an instrumental 
effect on our experience of God as the object of our attention and, thereby, 
broaden and deepen our knowledge of God.
Now, we turn to consider the second possibility, that the presence of 
others in corporate worship can have a causal impact on what we attend 
to. That is, the presence of others can dictate how we experience our friend. 
As we will suggest, one way of expanding this thought is by focusing on 
our joint engagement with God in corporate worship.
Evelyn Underhill, an Anglo-Catholic spiritual writer of the first half of 
the twentieth century, writes, “Christian worship is never a solitary un-
dertaking” because worship is part of a tradition forged in community, a 
tradition that stretches back to when Christ himself taught us to pray be-
ginning with “Our Father.”48 And so “the worshipping life the Christian,” 
according to Underhill, “whilst profoundly personal, is essentially that of 
 Consider, for instance, participating in corporate worship alongside a friend whom you 
know has been suffering from chronic pain. Suppose you are aware of God’s presence and 
are sharing attention with him throughout the liturgy, whilst also being aware of your friend. 
After receiving communion, you notice that something has changed in your friend—his 
shoulders are lifted, his eyes are brighter, and he manages a contented smile to you across 
the pew. As you become aware of this, you suddenly come to the realisation that God has 
brought some kind of healing to your friend. In seeing God’s interaction with your friend 
(albeit in an indirect way), corporate worship has allowed you not only to see your friend’s 
perception of God, but in some way, you see more of God as an object. Your knowledge of 
God as a person has been deepened and broadened by such an experience.
 We might still think that the point is still too general to explain the specific value of 
corporate worship, at least as we have explained it so far. More specifically, on the account 
considered so far, a person’s experience of other members of the congregation plays a purely 
instrumental role; thus, just as our experience of other congregants might shape our expe-
rience, so too might the comfortableness of the pew, the weather, the choice of altar flowers 
and one’s mood and emotions. Those who are not present might have a similar effect on our 
worship. Seeing an empty chair where a friend used to sit or walking past someone asking 
for money on the street on the way to Church might also alter our experience of God. Since 
we do not think, however, that corporate worship is the only thing which can broaden and 
deepen our knowledge of God, nor do we think the epistemic value of corporate worship is 
the only value, this does not seem too problematic. 
47It is important to clarify (as an anonymous referee has suggested to us) that whilst it is 
not possible for God to deceive us, this does not mean that it is impossible to be deceived 
about God. Yet, the question of whether we can be deceived about God relates more directly 
to condition (4), which focuses on our misperception of God, and so we will consider this 
objection later in the section. 
48Underhill, Worship, 81.
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a person who is also a member of a group.”49 Consequently, she maintains, 
“The Christian as such cannot fulfil his spiritual obligations in solitude.”50 
Furthermore, she argues,
No one soul—not even the greatest saint—can fully apprehend all that this 
has to reveal and demand of us, or perfectly achieve this balanced richness 
of response. That response must be the work of the whole Church; within 
which souls in their infinite variety each play a part, and give that part to the 
total life of the Body.51
Here we can see that it is not merely that others in the congregation co-
lour our own experience of God, but, rather, our experience of God, and, 
thereby, our knowledge of God, is bound up in our relation to the Church. 
As Underhill describes, liturgical worship requires a kind of “joint action” 
of the “Christian group.”52 In light of Underhill’s theology of the Church, 
one of the implications of taking corporate worship to be a collective act 
is that we must consider not only the relationship between an individual 
congregant and God, but also the relationship between each of the con-
gregants. Consequently, worship should not be taken to be a facilitation 
of many individual engagements with God which are enhanced by the 
environment of the Church, but, rather, as Underhill emphasises, worship 
is importantly social, where there is a collective engagement with God in 
and through the Church.
To further explore this understanding of worship as a social phenom-
enon, we turn to considering worship as an opportunity for mutual object 
(that is, God) perception, and we begin by noting that, whilst liturgical 
worship might allow us to share attention with God, this is not the only 
kind of shared attention which takes place in worship. Worship also in-
volves sharing attention with other members of the congregation. Indeed, 
many points in liturgy seek to draw our attention not only to the presence 
of God, but also to our fellow worshippers. Take the opening of one of the 
Eucharistic prayers from the Church of England’s Common Worship, for 
instance:
 The Lord is here.
All His Spirit is with us.
 Lift up your hearts.
All We lift them up unto the Lord.
 It is right to give praise to the Lord our God
All It is right to give thanks and praise.53
49Underhill, Worship, 83. 
50Underhill, Worship, 83.
51Underhill, Worship, 85.
52Underhill, Worship, 99.
53Common Worship, Holy Communion.
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Whilst this dialogue seeks to make the congregation aware that God is 
present in their worship, there is also a sense in which the congregation 
must be aware of one another in grasping the meaning of the statement, 
“His Spirit is with us.” That is, the individual congregant is not only made 
aware of God’s presence, but also, God’s presence acts as the object of a 
kind of mutual attention sharing between congregants. Let us expand this 
observation more precisely.
First, it is important to note that, whilst discussions of shared atten-
tion often focus on attention sharing between two persons, this does not 
preclude the possibility of much wider groups of people, say, a Church 
congregation, from engaging in joint, or shared, attention. As John 
Campbell notes, “Joint attention requires an object to which to attend 
and two or more people to attend to it. In principle there seems to be no 
limit to the number of people who could be jointly attending to the same 
object.”54 Secondly, whilst there is there is no consensus on the nature of 
joint attention,55 certain views of joint attention lend themselves better to 
our consideration of jointly attending to God in liturgical worship. More 
specifically, the relational view defended by Axel Seemann and John 
Campbell will lend itself well to our present discussion.56
As Campbell outlines the relational view,
[J]oint attention is a primitive phenomenon of consciousness. Just as the ob-
ject you see can be a constituent of your experience, so too it can be a constit-
uent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending 
to the object. This is not to say that in a case of joint attention, the other 
person will be an object of your attention. On the contrary, it is only the ob-
ject that you are attending to. It is rather, that, when there is another person 
with whom you are jointly attending to the thing, the existence of that other 
person enters into the individuation of your experience. The other person 
is there, as co-attender, in the periphery of your experience. The object at-
tended to, and the other person with whom you are jointly attending to that 
object, will enter into your experience in quite different ways.57
On the relational view of joint attention, attending to an object in the 
presence of another person alters the kind of experience one has. Or, as 
Campbell puts it,
[T]he individual experiential state you are in, when you and another are 
jointly attending to something, is an experiential state that you could not be 
in were it not for the other person attending to the object. The other person 
enters into your experience as a constituent of it, as co-attender, and the 
other person could not play that role in your experience except by being 
co-attender.58
54Campbell, “Joint Attention,” 287.
55Seemann, “Joint Attention,” 183.
56Seemann, “Joint Attention”; Campbell, “Joint Attention.”
57Campbell, “Joint Attention,” 288.
58Campbell, “Joint Attention,” 289.
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Thus, to take an example from Seemann, when you are driving with a 
passenger, “his focus of attention will have a particular kind of impact on 
yours”;59 when he looks in a certain direction at the road, “your focus of 
attention will quite automatically realign with his.”60 What is remarkable 
about this, as Seemann notes, is that, “although the other person is not 
what you are look at . . . her focus plays this controlling role” in the focus 
of your attention.61 Mutual awareness, as Seemann notes, requires “each 
involved creature to be causally sensitive to the thing in his or her own 
focus of attention and behaviour, and second, for each creature to be casu-
ally sensitive in this way to the other’s focus of attention and behavior.”62
Yet, to play this experience-shaping role, there must be some means 
of communication between those who are jointly attending to an object. 
Seemann notes that, “when we are jointly looking at an object, we are 
usually able to (and often do) point out the object of our attention to each 
other. We can direct each other’s focus to particular aspects of the scene 
we are considering.”63 As Melinda Carpenter and Kristen Liebal note, this 
communication between perceivers might occur via some kind of verbal 
communication, for example, “Isn’t that great?!,”64 or perhaps, some form 
of non-verbal communication, “just a meaningful, expressive look,”65 for 
instance.
The important point for our purposes, then, is that, if the relational view 
of joint attention is right, there is a structural difference in cases of mutual 
object-focusing and individual object-focusing. The co-attender structures 
and guides your perception of the object in important ways. This gives us 
the resources to begin to explain the thought behind Lewis’s friendship 
example. One of the things that is lacking after the death of Charles is not 
only Charles’s ability to alter instrumentally Ronald’s perception of all his 
other friends, but also his role in sharing attention with Ronald to jointly 
perceive objects in the world. Just as the experience of the road as an ob-
ject of joint attention between car passengers involves being related to the 
other perceiver, A’s perception of B as an object of joint attention involves 
a certain relation between A and B. If Seemann is right, then A and C can 
actively shape one another’s perception of B as an object of their attention. 
As Seemann puts it, individuals who engage in jointly attending to some 
object are “not only perceivers but also agents who shape the experiences 
of those others with whom they attend to objects in their environment.”66
59Seemann, “Joint Attention,” 184.
60Seemann, “Joint Attention,” 184.
61Seemann, “Joint Attention,” 184.
62Seemann, “Joint Attention,” 199.
63Seemann, “Reminiscing Together,” 7.
64Carpenter and Liebal, “Joint Attention, Communication,” 167.
65Carpenter and Liebal, “Joint Attention, Communication,” 167.
66Seemann, “Reminiscing Together,” 7. 
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The implications for corporate worship should now be obvious. Whilst 
it might be true that your environment can shape your perception, only 
those who are jointly perceiving can act in the agential way that Seemann 
describes. And, thus, only those who are present in worship and engaging 
in mutual object-focusing can take this active role in shaping your per-
ception. In this understanding of corporate worship, it is not that the 
congregants serve to enhance one another’s personal experiences of God, 
but rather, the congregants mutually guide one another’s experience of 
God, shaping one another’s focuses of attention through their interactions 
(whether verbal or non-verbal) through the liturgy. Whilst it is possible 
for such attention guiding merely to enhance each individual’s experience 
of God in the liturgy (such as in the instrumental way described at the 
end of the previous section), there is a way of resisting such a description 
here. As Carpenter and Liebal note, in triadically sharing attention with 
another person and mutually focusing on some object, it is possible to 
gain a kind of mutual perceptual knowledge.67 On their account of mutual 
knowledge, it is not merely that the presence of the other person shapes 
your own experience and, thereby, your own knowledge, but rather, they 
note, if attention is shared on some object and there is communication 
between the two perceivers, then they mutually know something about 
the object of their shared attention.
Such an analysis provides an interesting way of thinking about the es-
sentially joint actions of Christian liturgy which Underhill describes. Take 
the line of liturgy cited above, for example. In reciting the words, “The 
Lord is here. His Spirit is with us,” the script prompts a kind of mutual 
object-focusing on the presence of God through the use of verbal commu-
nication. That is, the congregant is made aware, by the script, not only 
of an object of perception (the presence of God), but also of their fellow 
perceivers (the rest of the congregation). This is one way of understanding 
what Underhill means when she states that “joint action is impossible 
without an agreed pattern, a liturgy; even though this pattern be of the 
simplest kind.”68
67Carpenter and Liebal, “Joint Attention, Communication,” 167.
68Underhill, Worship, 99. It might seem to some that, rather than focusing on God, the 
primary focus of attention sharing in the liturgy is the object of the priest and the liturgical 
script. Wolterstorff puts this point succinctly:
To whom are the people listening? To the minister, obviously the celebrant, the 
leader, the readers, the musicians. But is that all? In the Episcopal liturgy, at the 
conclusion of the first and second readings from Scripture, the reader says “This 
is the Word of the Lord.” . . . Said or assumed in each of these cases is that the 
people have been listening not just to the speaker but to what God said or says. 
(Wolterstorff, The God We Worship, 63–64)
While it is true that the direct object of shared attention is the script and the celebrant, it is 
by means of this object that the congregation can mutually focus on God. In listening to a 
sermon, as Søren Kierkegaard describes it, the role of the listener is not to pay attention only 
to the words of the preacher, but rather, the “listener during the speech has the task of paying 
attention to how he is hearing, whether through the discourse he within himself is secretly 
speaking with God” (Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses, 125). 
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How does the above account relate to Talbert’s condition concerning 
the accuracy of one’s perception? In allowing others to shape and guide 
our perception of God in the worship in the way we have outlined, one 
of the results is that our own biases and impairments can be corrected by 
sharing attention with others. When alone, we might have the tendency 
to focus on certain aspects of God’s character, and thereby build up a bi-
ased picture of God, in worship, it is possible to be guided by the focus of 
another’s attention.69 This change in our focus might simply be by means 
of the emphasis another person places on certain words, the shape and 
posture of their body, or even the focus of their gaze (on, say, the altar, or 
the cross, for example). All these ways might serve as pointers to redirect 
our own attention and thereby to experience some different aspect of God, 
thereby removing our biases in important ways.
We can appreciate this point when we consider our practice of reading 
and interpreting Scripture, something we have discussed above, as a way 
of sharing attention with God, and a typical activity in corporate worship. 
Underlying that discussion is an assumption that when we read and inter-
pret Scripture, we are doing it faithfully, for an unfaithful interpretation 
will not reveal God to us but rather serve as a mirror for our own indi-
vidual biases. Reading and interpreting Scripture in community serves as 
a corrective to our biases and helps us come to perceive God better than 
we would on our own. Hauerwas makes this point, in his characteristi-
cally provocative style:
No task is more important than for the Church to take the Bible out of the 
hands of individual Christians in North America. Let us no longer give 
the Bible to all children when they enter the third grade or whenever their 
assumed rise to Christian maturity is marked, such as eighth-grade com-
mencements. Let us rather tell them and their parents that they are pos-
sessed by habits far too corrupt for them to be encouraged to read the Bible 
on their own.70
To argue for his point, Hauerwas maintains that reading and interpreting 
the Bible faithfully requires spiritual and moral transformation, something 
that happens in the Church, where people become Christians and learn to 
read and interpret the Bible, not as answerable to “common sense,” but 
rather to the authority of a truthful community constituted by the Eucha-
rist.71 If Hauerwas is right, we can then readily see how corporate worship 
69As an anonymous referee helpfully points out—this kind of attention-shaping might 
occur by means of the conscious collective actions of those present in the liturgy, but there 
may also be some kind of collective consciousness present at a lower level. In the scientific 
research on quorum sensing in animals and bacteria (see Waters and Bassler, “Quorum 
Sensing,” for instance), it has been shown that some organisms communicate using chemical 
signals which allow bacteria to monitor its environment and alter its behaviour. A similar 
kind of communication might occur between humans in worship through a kind of subcon-
scious responsivity to social cues which makes it possible for individuals to in some sense 
perceive God together and guide one another’s attention.
70Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture, 15.
71Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture, 23.
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helps us to perceive God better than we otherwise would in individual 
worship: for in our reading and interpreting Scripture, as done typically in 
corporate worship, we learn how to read Scripture together, as a truthful 
community constituted by the Eucharist, where our own readings are 
informed not only by the readings of present members but also of past 
members, especially of spiritual masters, and this then corrects the biases 
inherent in our own readings that would lead us away from God rather 
than into significant presence with God, as Green and Quan describe.
However, whilst Lewis’s example is helpful to explain how corporate 
worship might allow for a broadening of a person’s knowledge of God 
as well as providing a correction for our biases, there are some potential 
shortcomings to corporate worship which this position also highlights. 
First, it is important to acknowledge that our social interactions with an-
other person can have a detrimental effect on our knowledge of a person, 
as well as a positive effect. Certain social environments might cause a 
friend to withdraw or bring out misleading aspects of their character. Fur-
thermore, our attention might be misleadingly directed towards certain 
aspects of our friend’s character which result in a strengthening of our 
own biases, not a correcting. Similarly, just as corporate worship can allow 
us to experience more of God and give God an opportunity to reveal more 
aspects of himself, there might also be detrimental effects to corporate 
worship. Some worship gatherings, for example, might emphasise only 
God’s anger and entirely ignore his love, by, say, ignoring some passages 
in Scripture. If corporate worship can alter our experience of God as an 
object of our attention, then such a possibility must be admitted. Although 
there is not space here to explore fully the epistemic costs of corporate 
worship, it is important to recognise that corporate worship can mislead-
ingly shape one’s experience of God. Indeed, in extreme cases, a person’s 
experience of God in certain contexts can give rise to what Michelle Pan-
chuk describes as “religious trauma” in which individuals wrongly feel 
shame towards God, and often lose their faith.72
As we have now seen, there are at least two ways of thinking about the 
phenomena involved in the kind of case Lewis suggests, both of which 
have some application in outlining the epistemic value of corporate wor-
ship in allowing us to know God better than we might by engaging only 
in individual worship. We first suggested that the corporate dimension of 
worship might firstly dictate the breadth and depth of our experience, and 
thereby our knowledge of God. We then claimed that corporate worship 
might also play a causal role in our sharing attention with God, through 
a kind of mutual object focusing. It is important to see that these two fea-
tures of corporate worship, though connected, can come apart. We can 
imagine, for instance, an evil neuroscientist having a causal influence on 
our experience, whilst playing no role as an object of our experience. It 
72Panchuk, “The Shattered Self.” We expand this point, on the dark side of corporate 
worship in Cockayne, Efird, and Warman, “Shattered Faith.” 
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also seems possible that those who are objects of our experience, and able 
to shape and colour our attention, might play little or no causal role in our 
experience, if, say, we attend a social gathering in which everyone is staring 
at their iPhones, disengaged from the goings on in the room. We have 
argued that corporate worship can both colour the phenomenology of our 
experience of God and also play a causal role in how we experience God. 
We have also seen that these two concepts are often connected—many of 
the examples we have given feature something of both phenomena—in 
pointing our attention towards as aspect of God’s character for instance, 
our fellow congregants might both shape the phenomenology of our expe-
rience of God, as well as playing a causal role in what we attend to.
This is particularly important when we consider how difficult it is for 
us to be significantly present to God, that is, to put ourselves in a position 
to experience God second-personally and to share attention with him. In 
such a context, the importance of co-perceivers is all the more apparent. 
Tanya Luhrmann makes this point vividly when she writes,
Human interaction—real human interaction, with two people together in 
a room—is remarkably dense. We move, touch gesture mimic . . . we scan 
people’s faces intently as we talk, and what we see in their faces affects what 
we say. . . . But God has no face. You cannot look him in the eye and judge 
that he hears you speak. He does not make the little phatic grunts we make 
to each other on the phone, to show we’re still listening. Even when people 
learn to pick mental events out of their mind that they attribute to God, it 
can be difficult for them to shake their doubts without that more fibrous 
quality of the human back-and-forth.73
As we have seen previously, without face-to-face interaction, shared 
attention then becomes difficult with God, not only because of God’s 
incorporeality but also because of our own sinful states of mind, being 
typically disinterested in God and distracted from him. In such a state, we 
need one another to help us come to know God, and to know him better, 
second-personally.74
Conclusion
We have argued that an individual’s second-personal knowledge of God 
is, in important ways, bound up in the community. To many theologians, 
this will not be a surprising conclusion to have reached; Scripture places 
an important emphasis to the community in relating rightly to God. Yet, 
73Luhrmann, When God Talks Back, 73.
74An anonymous referee asks, “Can there be genuine interaction with God without the 
worshipper feeling, for instance, forgiven by God or spoken to through the homily?” Our 
answer is that there are surely many more ways of experiencing God in corporate worship 
than we have space to explore in this paper. Our focus is narrow in scope to account for 
instance of shared attention and personal presence in worship. Yet, as we have seen in section 
one, there is more to knowing a person than just experiencing his or her presence. Our claim 
is not that this is the only experience of God a worshipper could have during worship, nor 
that this is the only benefit of corporate worship. To give an exhaustive account of corporate 
experiences of God would far surpass what we have space to discuss in this paper.
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often in discussions of religious epistemology and religious experience, 
this corporate dimension to our relationship with God is overlooked. In 
this paper, we have shown how a focus on the community of faith can en-
rich and expand our discussions of knowing God and experiencing God. 
Yet, there is still much more to be done. For instance, whilst our focus 
has been on the importance of attention sharing in liturgical worship, we 
know that many neuro-atypical individuals struggle to participate in this 
kind of activity. And so, more needs to be said to provide a properly in-
clusive account of common worship.75 Moreover, whilst we have touched 
on important issues relating to the shared experiences of worshippers, it 
also seems that beliefs are in some way shared in the Church; “We believe 
in God . . . ” begins the Nicene Creed, which is recited in the majority of 
church liturgies weekly. But what does it mean for the Church to believe 
in this way? Or what is the relationship between individual believers and 
the gathered whole? The shared nature of the actions and beliefs of the 
gathered Church, along with the question of just what metaphysical status 
the gathered Church has, are questions which provide ample material for 
important developments in the philosophy of worship and Church prac-
tice.76
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